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NEW EXPOSITION OF THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE by A. E. KROEGER.

Part Fourth.

Knowledge posits itself for-itself as an absolutely determined System of Moral Impulses; or as a Moral World.

CONTENTS OF PART FOURTH.

- § 1. The perception of a Factual world is not possible without a further determinedness of that world, which is known as the Moral Law.
- § 2. The perception of individual existence, and of a natural impulse, is not possible without the perception of individual Freedom.
- § 3. The *knowledge* (not mere perception) of Freedom is not possible without a contact with other free beings.
- § 4. Results.
- § 5. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factual world in sensuous perception in the form of an absolute immediately perceptible Being.
- § 6. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factual world in knowledge in a determinedness of the system of moral impulses through the absolute form of a law.
- § 7. The Science of Knowledge as the schematic representation of the whole Ego and the absolute realization of its whole Freedom, in its form of absolute reflectibility of all the relations of the Ego.

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- § 1. The perception of a Factual world is not possible without a further determinedness of that world, which is known as the Moral Law.

In the preceding part we have described and completed the conception of the material world; a conception which, rightly understood and applied, must suffice everywhere. A natural philosophy could be erected upon it without any further preliminaries. It is to be expected that its opposite reposes in

Thinking, as itself does in contemplation, and that that opposite will be the moral world, and that it will appear how both worlds are altogether one and the same, and that the moral world is the ground of the material world; the manner in which it is thus the ground, being however incomprehensible. Hence we add at once an investigation into the transcendental ground of the material world. The question is this: In order to be able to *think* the moral world, we *contemplate* it in the material world; (or, the material world is the contemplation of the thinking of the moral world;) and this would be easily comprehended if both worlds appeared in all knowledge. But common experience teaches that this is not so; that, by far, the fewest individuals elevate themselves to pure thinking, and hence to the conception of a moral world, whilst nevertheless every one has the sense of perception of the material world; and this is confirmed by the Science of Knowledge, since it makes Thinking dependent upon the realization of Freedom within the already realized factical knowledge, and hence denies its actual necessity altogether. But how, then, do these individuals, who do not think, arrive at a knowledge of their world? It is evident that the answering of this question decides the whole fate of transcendental Idealism.

1. According to our doctrine, confirmed as it has been in all our previous reflections, all possible knowledge has only itself for an object, and no other object but itself. It has also been shown that, as a result of the contents of the Science of Knowledge, the *entire* knowledge does not always and under every condition view itself; that, therefore, what in the Science of Knowledge is only a part, may, in a determined actuality, view itself as the entire knowledge, but that it may also go beyond itself in a lower point of reflection to a higher one, though always *remaining within itself*.

2. Hence there is a manifold of reflections of knowledge within knowledge, all of which are synthetically connected and form a system. This manifoldness, its connection and relation, has been explained from the inner *laws of possibility* of a knowledge, as such; an inner, merely formal legislation in knowledge, based on the realizing or not-realizing itself of a formal Freedom; when realizing itself, doing so without any further condition; and when not, remaining in mere possibil-

ity (the possibility to realize itself whenever it chooses): in it Thinking, Contemplation, Manifoldness, Time, Space—yes, nearly everything which we have heretofore deduced—is grounded.

3. But with this merely formal legislation, knowledge, as an infinite quantitating, would dissolve into nothing. We should never arrive at a knowledge, and hence never either at the application of that legislation, if knowledge were not in some manner checked in that infinity, and checked immediately, as soon as knowledge is formed or realized; on no account, however, within an already formed (realized) knowledge, for without that primary condition also no knowledge is realized.

4. The law, just uttered, does therefore no longer belong to the system of that legislation which relates to those manifold reflections within knowledge; for this system presupposes already knowledge, so far as the Being thereof is concerned, and determines it only *formaliter* within this Being; whereas the law referred to first makes this Being itself possible; only possible, not yet real. Hence it is in reality the result of a reciprocity between the absolute actually becoming Being and an absolute Being, which, according to the Science of Knowledge, is purely thought in knowledge, and *is to be presupposed* prior to every knowledge, to the real as well as to the possible knowledge. This is to prepare the following; for:

5. This state within quantity is in a certain respect—in which we shall shortly see—always a determined state, amongst other possible states. There is consequently a law of determination, and the cause of it is evidently not within knowledge, in no possible significance of the word, but within absolute Being. This law of determination will appear in pure thinking as the *moral law*. But how does it appear where knowledge arrives at no pure thinking? This again is the question asked before.

Now let us consider the following:

a. Knowledge never penetrates and seizes itself, *because* it objectivates and dirempts itself by reflection. The diremption of the highest reflection is into an absolute thinking and contemplation, while absolute knowledge beyond them is neither contemplation nor thinking, but the identity of both.

b. In the contemplation, which is altogether inseparable

from knowledge, the contemplation is therefore lost within itself, and does not at all comprehend itself. True, in thinking it comprehends itself; but then it is no longer contemplating, but thinking. The infinity, and with it the realism of contemplation, which results from it, is done away with altogether, and in its place we obtain as its representative a totalizing picturing of the infinity. Let us, therefore, pay no attention to this thinking.

c. The knowledge which comprehends itself, as we have just described it under *a* and *b*, thinks the contemplation as an inseparable part of knowledge, and for that very reason as not comprehending itself. That knowledge, therefore, thinks and comprehends very well the absolute incomprehensibility and infinity as the condition of all knowledge, the form, the *That* of it. (This is important.)

d. In this thus understood incomprehensibility = the material world, viewed objectively, not formally, we cannot speak at all about *determinedness* or *non-determinedness*. For all determinedness is founded on a comprehending and thinking; but here we neither comprehend nor think; the object of this contemplation is posited as the absolute incomprehensibility itself.

Conclusions.—*a.* The expression “material world” involves, strictly taken, a contradiction. In this contemplation, there is in reality no universe and no totality, but only a floating, undetermined infinity, which is never comprehended. A universe exists only in thinking, but then it is already a moral universe. (This will enable us to judge certain theories respecting nature.)

b. All questions about the best world, about the infinity of the possible worlds, &c., dissolve, therefore, into nothing. A material world, in its completion and closedness, we can obtain only after the completion of time, which is a contradiction; hence we can obtain it within no time. But the moral world, which is before all time and which is the ground of all time, is not the best, but is the only possible and altogether necessary world; i. e. the simply good.

c. But there is within contemplation in every time-moment a determinedness of quality, and (since thinking applies the infinity to it) a determinedness of quantity; let it be well

remembered, for a simply objective and empirical thinking, finding itself as such at the realization of knowledge. This is the conception of an object of mere perception. Where is the ground of this determinedness? We now stand right before our question. Evidently in an *a priori*, altogether incomprehensible, and only actually in the time-moments to be comprehended absolute law of the empirical time-thinking generally.

It is an *a priori* incomprehensible law, we have said; for, if it were comprehensible by a free picturing and gathering together of time, the Ego would not be limited to itself and no knowledge would ever be realized. Hence it is an altogether immediate *determinedness through the absolute*—(only *formally* thinkable)—*Being itself*; the law of a time-succession, which lies altogether beyond all time. For every single moment carries, as we have already shown, all future moments conditionally within itself.

Result.—There is a law, which on no account forces a knowledge into being, but which, if a knowledge exists, absolutely forces its determinedness, and in consequence of which each individual sees in each moment a material, and materially thus constituted experience. The law is an immediate law of knowledge, and connects immediately with knowledge. *That* this is so, and that, if we are at all to attain a knowledge, this must be so, each one can understand; but concerning the substance of the determinedness, and the manner in which knowledge itself originates and in which that law connects with knowledge, *nothing can be comprehended*, for this very non-comprehension is the condition of the realization of knowledge. All attempts to go beyond it are empty dreams, which no one understands, or can demonstrate as true. The *moral* significance of nature can well be understood, but not any other and higher significance of nature; for pure nature is nothing more and portends nothing more than what it is.

Whoever says: there is a material world altogether constituted as I see, hear, feel and think it,—utters simply his perception, and is, so far, right. But when he says: this world affects me as in-itself-Being, produces sensations, representations, &c., within me,—he no longer gives utterance to his perception, but to an explanatory thought, in which there is not

the least grain of sense, and says something which lies beyond the possibility of knowledge. He can say only : if I open my exterior senses, I find them thus determined. More he does not know ; but every one can comprehend that, if more could be known, there would be no knowledge at all. (These are the immanent, strict proofs of transcendental Idealism.)

‡ 2. The perception of individual existence, and of a natural impulse, is not possible without the perception of individual Freedom.

As the first principle of the empirical, we have discovered :
1. A law, applicable only to absolute Being (how, we know not yet, nor is that the question), connects itself immediately with a knowledge, *if* a knowledge is, in order to develop a succession of qualities, which for that knowledge is altogether accidental and *a priori* incomprehensible. (The succession, as this fixed succession, does not lie within the law but within knowledge ; in the law lies only, that, since a succession must be, it must be qualitatively determined in such and such a manner.) As this law, if a knowledge is, realizes itself altogether in the same manner, we have taken only one empirical knowledge and one Ego as the representative of all empirical Egos. The Ego, therefore, which appears here, is the mere position of formal knowledge generally, *that* a knowledge is, and nothing else.

2. For this Ego the appearance of nature at each moment, i. e. each of her conditions, regarded as a whole (for we may discover another kind of moments), is, in accordance with our previous reflections, *impulse*—of course, an organic one, an impulse of nature (natural impulse).

The knowledge (feeling) of this impulse is, however, not possible without the *realization* of the same—*activity* ; and since (especially empirical) activity is not a thing *per se*, but can be only a passing condition of knowledge, we say the Ego appears to itself immediately as acting. This acting alone—at least, as far as we have come at present—must be regarded as the immediate life of the Ego, from which everything else which we have heretofore met, and especially the will-less impelling nature, is first understood.

3. But this acting appears, as we have often said, in the *form of a line* ; not as an organizing, but as a mechanizing, as free

motion, and hence within *time*. In so far the Ego in this acting remains confined within nature, and attached to it; it is itself the highest phenomenon of nature. But in the present nature infinite directions are possible from every point. About these directions nature, thus viewed, can determine absolutely nothing; because in nature, in the law of her contemplation, there can be altogether no determination of these directions. Hence in this point, in the giving itself a *direction*, the Ego tears itself loose, by the formal primary law of its character, from Being, or nature lets it loose, which means the same thing. Here, the *Being Free* is absolute, formal law.

4. Again: Even in so far as the intelligence gives itself up to the natural law of the concretion—as it certainly must, if it is to arrive at a knowledge of itself—it nevertheless thinks itself free in every point of this concretion; and hence makes at the same time the succession of nature its own *succession of time and motion*..

But in the same manner again the intelligence connects the single points of its freedom beyond the concretion of nature, into a higher *Thought-succession*, independent of nature; and unites the single moments of its acts in the unity of a *conception of a DESIGN* which forms a junction with nature, but, in its own connection, lies beyond it. From this we derive the following important result: Even the natural impulse elevates the Ego immediately above the *given concretion* of nature, in which it finds itself as contemplating, to a totality of acting, to a plan, &c.; because as acting it no longer merely contemplates itself, but also thinks. Hence the original self-contemplation of the Ego includes not only that it contemplates itself as free acting, giving direction, &c., but also that it should connect this acting, and hence posit independent designs within nature.

a. Through this reflection, the above assertion, “Each individual Ego comprehends itself necessarily as lasting a certain time, and as moving freely,” receives its real significance and application. The conception of acting and of positing designs as the real *contents* of that individual time and motion, is here added, and it becomes clear how the individual time and experience unlooses itself from the *general* knowledge, and how

the individual Ego originates within this general ground-form of knowledge.

b. The proposition: Unless I elevate myself to moral Freedom *I* do not act, but nature acts through me; means now, regarded more closely, the following: I, although an individual and determining myself with free will, hence torn loose from and elevated above nature, have nevertheless immediately only a *natural plan* and design, which I prosecute, however, in the form and according to the law of a rational Being. The Freedom of the Ego in regard to nature is here still formal and empty.

5. The result of the preceding may therefore be expressed in the following propositions:

a. The Ego does not arrive at all to the perception of the dead, will-less, in all its time-determinations unchangeably determined nature, without finding itself as acting.

b. The ground-law of this acting, that it assumes a line-direction, does not lie in nature, which does not extend so far at all, but it is an immanent, formal law of the Ego; and the ground of it lies altogether in knowledge, as such.

c. But the direction is a fixed one, and the Ego which reposes in this standpoint necessarily ascribes to itself also the ground of the determinedness of this direction, since it cannot ascribe it to nature; and since besides nature and the Ego, there is nothing here.

d. But as there is still a something higher for us, and perhaps for all knowledge, a going beyond its actual Being, in order to ascend to the transcendental cause of its possibility, which we have not yet attempted from *this* point, we shall not yet decide whether the Ego is also the transcendental ground of the direction, contenting ourselves with stating what we know. This, strictly, is only the following: The knowledge of which we now speak is perception; the Ego, therefore, perceives itself as ground of a fixed direction; or, more strictly, *the Ego perceives in the perception of its real acting, of which fixed direction it is the ground.*

6. Here we obtain at once an important result, which we cannot pass by on account of the strictness of the system. On the one side, the result of our former deduction was: The percep-

tion of the material world is dependent upon the perception (self-realization) of Freedom; the latter is the *ideal ground* of the former, for only through means of the latter do we arrive at all at a knowledge. On the other side, we have found above: that the perception of Freedom is dependent upon the perception of the material world; the latter is the *real ground* of the former, for only the latter gives to Freedom the possibility of a real acting. The relation is the same as in contemplation between form of body and form of line, which also were mutually dependent upon each other; or, higher, in the original synthesis of knowledge, as between the absolute form of contemplation and the ground-form of Thinking. Hence, perception, κατ' ἐξουχίην, the absolute form and the extent of *immediate* knowledge, is neither perception of the dead world nor of the world of Freedom, but altogether of both in their inseparability and in their immediate opposition as postulated through immediate reflection; its object, the universe, is also altogether in itself the One; but is in its appearance divided into a material and an intellectual world. (It appears how our investigation approaches its close. The whole factical knowledge, the material world, has now been synthetized; it only remains to bring this world into a complete relation with its higher branch-member, the intellectual world, and our work is done. For with the separate subjects and objects, and their psychological appearances and differences, a Transcendental Philosophy has nothing to do.)

This perception of Freedom can easily be changed from an individual into a general one by this remark: My Freedom is to be the ground of a *real* acting. It has been shown, however, that I am not real except as in reciprocity with all other knowledges, and reposing upon the general one knowledge—thus really actualizing one of the *real possibilities* of this knowledge within itself. Hence, whatever there is perceptible for me in me, has, in so far as it has been *really* actualized, acted, done—entered into the sphere of the real (of perception), of all. Thus, in accordance with our premises, it is apparent of itself (what no former philosophy has thoroughly explained) how free Beings know of the productions of the Freedom of others: the actualized *real* Freedom is the determined realization of a possibility of the general perception, in

which the Egos are not divided, but are rather one—are only one perceiving Ego.

‡ 3. The *knowledge* (not mere perception) of Freedom is not possible without a contact with other free beings.

This connection of the general perception with Freedom and its self-realizations, and the principle of this relation, which we have touched upon only in passing, must be explained further. We introduce the explanation by the following considerations:

1. I, the individual, apply, according to a former synthesis, the particular manifestation of my power to a general power, which I did not at all perceive, but merely *thought* there, and which I placed before me in the form of contemplation as a something of an organized body (we select this expression with care). This my manifestation of power is real and enters accordingly into the general perception, means evidently: it is traced back, with all that follows from it, to the general perception, to the unity of a person, partly immediately posited in space, partly determining itself with Freedom. Now this person is at first a whole of nature, absolutely encircling a particular time-moment, and thus arising in the general time, and for the general perception, from nothing: a link of the described time-succession in nature; but at the same time the commencement of the appearance of a *rational being* in time, of which an acting, extending necessarily beyond the nature-succession, catches back into nature; finally, a determined body, at present only for the general perception of nature, but not as above, an undetermined somewhat of an organic body.

2. This free acting, accomplished through the medium of the body, according to what law can it move? Evidently according to the same law through which, in our former reflections, knowledge of Freedom generally was produced: the law that it must be immediately thought and comprehended in perception as an acting, which can manifest itself only in the form of a line, and which, therefore, takes its direction not from nature, but from out of itself. The chief point to be observed lies in the *immediateness* of this self-contemplation, which excludes everything like a deduction, comprehending from premises,

&c., since this would destroy totally the character of the perception, and hence the possibility of all knowledge.

3. Let us also add the following passing remark, which is an important hint for the future. A certain time-moment in the general time, a space-moment of the universal matter, lies immediately in the succession of perception as filled with a body which can manifest itself absolutely altogether only as Freedom. The ground-principle of the *contents* of this succession, but on no account of its formal existence, was absolute Being. But, viewed as a principle of nature, absolute Being is altogether no principle of a view of Freedom; hence it becomes here particularly, at the same time, principle of Freedom and thus the ground of that mixed perception of a nature and of a rational acting posited within it at the same time, which we have just described. This may become important.

4. But what is—on the part of the general perception and of any representative thereof (any individual Ego)—the condition of contemplating other free subjects outside of itself, of the representative Ego? Evidently, since Freedom and its ground-law can be perceived only in an individuality-point, the condition is, that that Ego must find the ground-law within itself in order to be able to find it also outside of itself: hence, expressed in general terms; the condition is, that knowledge is not merely simply confined contemplation, but likewise *reflection, knowledge of knowledge*, i. e. of Freedom and the within-itself generation of knowledge. In the self-contemplation of our own Freedom, Freedom, *κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, is known (direct, because it is the real substance of knowledge).

5. Again—let the *nervus probandi* be well noted which in my other writings has been very elaborately described, but which here, now that perception has been thoroughly determined, can be gathered into one word:—since the individual Ego contemplates its Freedom only within *universal* Freedom, which constitutes a closed thinking, its Freedom is *realiter* only real within a contemplation of infinite Freedom, and as a particular limitation of this infinity. But Freedom as Freedom is limited only through other Freedom; and actually manifests Freedom only through other actually manifested Freedom.

6. Hence it is the condition of a knowledge of knowledge,

of self-perception as the principle of all other perception, that, besides the free manifestation of the individual, other free manifestations, and, by their means, other free substances, should be perceived. Reciprocity through actual manifestation of free acting is condition of *all* knowledge. Each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows generally (*a priori*, through original thinking) of acting, of Freedom. Again: Each one knows of the acting of others, *idealiter*, only by means of his own acting from out of himself. Finally: each one knows of his acting only in so far as he knows of the acting of others, *realiter*; for the character of his particular acting (and generally he himself) is in knowledge result of the knowledge of the acting of the totality.

Hence no free Being arrives at a consciousness of himself without at the same time arriving at a consciousness of other Beings of the same kind. No one, therefore, can view himself as the whole knowledge, but only as a single standpoint in the sphere of knowledge. The intelligence is within itself and in its most inner root, as existing, not One, but a manifold; at the same time, however, a closed manifold, a *system* of rational Beings.

(Nature—thus we will call her hereafter exclusively in opposition to the intelligences—is now placed before us as one and the same, coursing through infinite time and solid space, which she fills. If, as bearer of the free individuals and their actions, we must not split her further—which it is not the object of the Science of Knowledge further to do—she will always remain this One. In this very form she is the proper object of Speculative Physics, as a guide of Experimental Physics—for to nothing else must the former present claims—and must thus be received by that science. But in the world of intelligence there is absolute manifoldness, and this manifoldness remains always on the standpoint of *perception*; for knowledge is for itself a *quantitating*. Only in the sphere of pure thinking there may also be discovered a *formal*—on no account real—unity even of this world.)

§ 4. Results.

1. Each individual's knowledge of the manifestations of his Freedom is dependent upon his knowledge of the general

Freedom-manifestation and upon the general knowledge thereof. It is, as we have learned already from other examples, a determined closed thinking within another—just now discovered—thinking of a determined whole. Hence it is itself determined thereby; the Freedom in individual knowledge is result of the general Freedom, and therefore necessarily determined by it; there is no perceptible Freedom of a single individual. His character as well as the character of his acting proceeds from his reciprocity with the whole world of Freedom.

2. In the general perception of each individual, nature does not appear any further than follows from his reciprocity with his perceived system of Freedom. For the Ego of each individual, as this particular one, appears to him only in this reciprocity and is determined by it; but nature he feels and perceives and characterizes only in the impulse thus directed towards his particular Ego. Hence, if the possibility of a manifestation of Freedom is presupposed, nature results without anything further from the self-contemplation of that Freedom; is merely another view of Freedom; is the sphere and the immediately at the same time posited object of Freedom; and there is thus no further necessity at all for another absolute principle of the perception of nature. Hence nature, as manifestation of the Absolute, in which light we viewed it above, (let no one be led astray by this remark; perhaps a disjunction takes place here within nature, only without our perceiving it,) is totally annihilated, and is now merely a form of the contemplation of our Freedom, the result of a formal law of knowledge.

3. The impulse which is *idealiter* determined through the reciprocity of general Freedom and through knowledge, would thus be the only firm object remaining in the background, except the undeterminable and in so far in-itself-dissolving general Freedom. This impulse would be the *substante*, but only in regard to that part of it which enters knowledge, and on no account determined in its real contents through knowledge; and the manifestation of Freedom would be its *accidence*; but, let it be well remarked, simply a formal, in nowise a materializing accidence; for only in so far as the impulse really impels, acts (apart from its body-form in which it appears in contem-

plation which falls away here), does it enter knowledge; hence, in so far as it is posited it impels necessarily. It is, therefore, *accidence* simply in so far as it enters the form of knowledge, in so far as it is a knowledge at all. Thus also the *general* Freedom is not *realiter* free, but only *formaliter*; it acts ever according to all its empirical knowledge, and knows only of that according to which it acts. Only this knowledge itself seems still to be *materialiter* free, if there are impulses beyond real knowledge. (Of its formal Freedom, inner absoluteness, we do not speak now.)

4. According to a former remark, knowledge, in obedience to a formal law, separates the plan, assigned to it by the natural impulse, into a succession of mutually determined, manifold acts; and only thus does it arrive at a knowledge of its *real* acting, and hence of its Freedom and of knowledge generally. But the links of this succession have significance only *in* the succession; the next following links annihilate them. Hence the Ego expressly proposes to itself the perishable, as perishable and on account of its perishability, and makes this its object: a mere living from one moment to another without ever thinking on what will come next. But, still more, even every closed moment of nature itself (hence the impulse and plan of nature) lies within an unclosed contemplation, and thus carries within itself the ground of a future moment and thereby its own annihilation in that moment; and is therefore also, an essentially perishable plan. Hence, all acts excited by the impulses of nature are necessarily directed upon the perishable; for everything in nature is perishable.

5. According to what we have said previously, nature develops herself according to a law which can have its ground only in absolute Being. Now even if we intended to restore this law to nature, in so far as nature appears in knowledge as real, as the bearer of knowledge, it would still be, for the standpoint of perception, merely a *formaliter* posited law; but on no account one which could explain to us the connection which we can only perceive. Allowing this interpretation, about which we desire not to give an opinion at present whether it will be admitted or not, it would, to be sure, give to nature an apparent (because time is infinite and never completed) unity of plan, but of which each single plan would be

merely a piece torn out, the relation of which to the whole would remain unknown to us. We should thus, in these acts, give ourselves up to a strange, concealed plan, unknown to us, which we should not know ourselves, and hence knowledge would not yet have penetrated into itself, since its origin and root would still remain in the dark.

‡ 5. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in sensuous perception in the form of an absolute immediately perceptible Being.

We have advanced to the universality of the perception of empirical Freedom, and have deduced from it nature itself and the universality of the perception of nature. Only one thing remained, which we could not deduce and of which we remained ignorant, a certain impulse directed upon Freedom, which we, however, called impulse of nature, although we, it is true, knew so much of it that it was not an impulse of *dead* nature. It seemed to appear plainly that nothing more could be explained from that sphere. The empirical world may have been traced on its own ground back to its highest cause, where it becomes lost to the empirical eye.

1. Let us, therefore, commence from the other side, and from its highest point, which we know well enough already. Knowledge is an absolute origin from nothing, and this within an equally absolute *For-itself*. Looking at the latter, there is hence in knowledge a pure, absolute Being; and as soon as it comprehends this same Being, i. e. the pure thought thereof, as is required here, it is, in this respect, *itself* pure absolute Being; i. e. as knowledge. (By the last addition of the absolute self-penetration of pure thinking, the proposition becomes a new one; for pure thinking itself, as lost in the positing of objects, with the entire synthesis connected therewith, has been sufficiently explained above.)

Concerning this knowledge, its substance and its form, let the following suffice. As far as regards the substance, it is the absolute form of knowledge, of self-grasping itself; not as act, however, but as *Being*: in one word, the pure, absolute Ego. In its form it is unchangeable, eternal, imperishable; all of which, it is true, are but second-hand characteristics. In itself it is unapproachable; it is the absolute Being, the in-itself-reposing. Again, it bears, and should be

thought as bearing, the here altogether predominating character of perception; i. e. *formaliter*. This is to be understood as follows: Knowledge recognizes itself as accidental. But *how* then, and according to what premises? How does it recognize the accidental, and how does it class knowledge, let us say, as a *species* under that *genus*? Altogether according to no premises derived from experience—such an assumption would be an absurdity—but simply immediately, primarily. How does it think the absolute, in opposition to which it recognizes as only accidental? Likewise primarily. And how does it recognize in both these recognitions itself as absolute? Likewise in a primary manner. It is simply thus, and more cannot be said about it; knowledge cannot go beyond itself.

2. Now, this thus described thinking is not possible without an opposite quantitating contemplation, in accordance with the synthesis which has become so familiar to us. In this contemplation absolute knowledge, or the pure Ego, quantitates itself; i. e. it repeats itself in a (scheme) picture. This contemplation as adjoining link of a thinking is the—necessarily closed—contemplation of a system of rational Beings. Reason, therefore, in the immediate contemplation of itself places itself necessarily also outside of itself; the pure Ego is repeated in a closed number, and this results altogether from the thinking of its formal absoluteness. (Let it be well understood: it is no contradiction of the above that this system, as it enters sensuous perception, is infinite, i. e. actually unattainable for this perception and not to be completed; for between thinking and perception there enters here one of the ground-forms of quantitating—infinite time. But it does follow that in every moment wherein perception is to take place the Ego must be posited as closed for perception, although the infinite continuation of perception carries it in each future moment beyond its present. It does not, however, *follow* from any empirical premises, but *is* absolutely so, that the Ego—the Egos—beyond all perception, and as ground of the same, are closed in the pure idea of reason, or in God.)

This is the ground-point of the intelligible world. Now to that of the opposite, the sensuous world. From the manifoldness of the Egos contained in the contemplation of reason, we select one as a representative. This, in perception, is alto-

gether confined to itself as individual, and cannot, as in thinking, go beyond to the contemplation of a pure reason-world. But this confinedness is the ground of all perception, which, as being itself absolute contemplation, is the condition of the possibility of absolute thinking. As an individual, however, it is the *thus or thus* determined individual in the whole succession of individuals; but since this succession and its totality exists only in thinking, how is it then, or rather its *result*, before all thinking? And if, in the whole reason-world, no individual were to elevate himself to thinking—which is possible since thinking depends upon Freedom—how will it then be in perception? According to the above, in its form, even as an empirically absolute and only perceptible, but no further explainable *Being* (which is thus, because it is thus and finds itself thus). We touch here again, only in another form, the impulse, which remains in the dark.

But how, now, does this relation, which in pure thinking is recognized as determined through absolute Being, become here, where it is not recognized and can therefore not be the result of a recognition, nevertheless an *immediately perceptible* Being?

Important as the question is, the answer is quite as simple. This question is the highest and most important which a philosophy can propose to itself. It is the question after a harmony, and since the question concerning the harmony of things and knowledge (which presupposes a dualism), and the question concerning the harmony of the several free Beings, which is based upon the idea of automatic Egos, have vanished into empty air—because it was shown that those separates could not but harmonize since they were in reality one and the same; in the one direction, the same in the general perception; and in the other direction, the same in the *One absolute Being*, which posits itself in determined points of reflection within an infinite time-succession, according to the absolutely quantitating ground-form of knowledge—it is the question after a harmony between the *intelligible world and the world of appearances*—the material world;—(that is, where this exists, in the immediate-itself-grasping, factual ground-form of knowledge, which therefore appears even prior to the realization of Freedom—of thinking—of which it is the pre-

supposition, and where there is, on that account, not yet true individuality.) The answer is easy and immediately apparent:

The universal perception has for its ground-substance nothing else than the relation of the perceiving individual to other individuals in a purely intelligible world; for only thus *is* that perception, and is a knowledge at all. Without this that perception would nowhere come to itself, but would dissolve in the infinite emptiness—if, in that case, there would be any human understanding at all, to posit it for the mere sake of letting it dissolve. And this is so in consequence of its relation to absolute Being, which relation is in perception itself never recognized, but remains concealed to it for all eternity. This relation, considered in the previous paragraphs in the form of impulse, is the immanent root of the world of appearances to every one who appears to himself. Now this perception brings its time, its space, its acting, its knowledge of the acting of others, and hence its knowledge of nature along with itself, and can therefore not go beyond its really egotistical and idealistical standpoint; its world, therefore, and—since this applies to the universal perception—the whole world of appearances is purely the mere formal law of an individual knowledge, hence the mere, pure Nothing; and instead of receiving from the region of pure thinking perhaps a sort of Being, the material world is, on the contrary, from that very region decisively and eternally buried in its Nothingness.

‡ 6. Harmony of the Moral world and the Factical world in knowledge in a determinedness of the system of moral impulses through the absolute form of a law.

Now to the union of the groundpoints of both worlds *within* knowledge, for outside of knowledge they are united through the absolute Being.

Empirical Being was to signify a particular, positive relation of the perceiving individual to an in so far perceived number of other individuals, according to a law of the intellectual world, which other individuals are, therefore, presupposed as differing in their primary Being. But in the contemplation of reason they do not (at present) differ at all in their essence, but are merely numerically different. Hence it would be necessary, for the possibility of perception, to presuppose another differ-

ence of the individuals, not merely a numerical, but a *real* difference, lying beyond perception; and this difference must appear in knowledge when it is to elevate itself to the thinking of perception, as having its ground in the intellectual world. It would be, what we are seeking for, our last problem, a connecting link between absolute thinking and absolute contemplation. This, now, is easily found, and has, indeed, already discovered itself to us, if the principle of perception is *thought* in the very same manner as we have just now thought it, i. e. as the result of my relation to the absolute sum of all individuals, but in such a manner that it *appear* at the same time *in perception*. This last clause is decisive, and I wish to be understood in respect to it. In point of fact, as we well know, thinking and contemplation never join together, not even in their highest point. Only through thinking are they *understood* as one and the same; but in contemplation they remain divided by the infinite gulf of time. The true state is this: It is always only perception which is thought by that intellectual conception; this perception is, it is true, beyond and imperceivably altogether one, and embraces in this oneness the relation of all individuals to each other; but I have never perceived *the whole* of my relation, awaiting, as I do, from the future further enlightenment. Hence the world of reason is never surveyed entire as a fact; its unity *is* only, but is not perceivable; and it is not known except in Thinking; in actuality it expects from that *Being* infinite enlightenment and progress.

Formaliter there results from this, firstly, that it is perception and the principle thereof which is thought. The inseparable ground-form of perception as inner contemplation is time. With this contemplation there enters a something of discovered time, and if the real substance of the perception is an acting, there enters also a plan of this acting—dividing itself into mediating acts—and with the thought of this plan an infinite time, for each moment of that time falls within an infinite contemplation which demands future moments.

Secondly, there results this, that a thinking takes place, and that it is the Ego which is thought as principle of the perception. The character of the Ego in relation to knowledge—and in that relation the Ego is to be thought here; let this be well understood—is absolute starting and causing to originate

from nothingness; hence free manifestation in a time-succession; and thus the Ego thinks itself whenever it elevates itself to the thinking of itself. There arises for the sphere of perception a succession of *absolute creating from Nothingness*, *realiter* recognizable for each moment of perception. (I express a comprehensive statement in few words; these words, however, are not to be understood metaphorically, but literally.)

Let us now gather together this infinite time with its determinations into one through a conception; we cannot abstract, in doing so, altogether from time; for, if we did, we should lose the relation to perception, the determinedness of the individual, and we should again return to the merely numerical difference of the Egos in the pure contemplation of reason. The contents of that time is the determinedness of an acting of an individual—as principle of perception—independent of and preceding all perception.

But what, moreover, is the ground-principle of this determinedness? In the idea, the absolutely closed sum of intelligences; in perception, the sum of those intelligences that have entered knowledge and been recognized at a particular time. But the intelligences are posited in the contemplation of reason as altogether harmonizing in their absolute self and world knowledge; hence, also, as harmonizing in the perception which is determined through this contemplation of reason through the uniting thinking. What everyone thinks absolutely of himself, he must be able to think that all who elevate themselves to absolute thinking, think likewise of him. The outward form of the described acting is, therefore, that everyone should do (I will express myself in this manner for brevity's sake), what all the intelligences embraced in the same system of perception, absolutely thinking, must think that he does, and what he must think, that they think it. It is an acting according to the system of the absolute harmony of all thinking, of its pure identity. (I believe we term this *moral acting*.)

Finally, what was the ground of this idea of a closed system of mutually determined intelligences in the pure thinking of the contemplation of reason, and the thinking of perception determined thereby? Absolute Being itself, constituting and

carrying knowledge : hence an absolute mutual penetration of both. The deepest root of all knowledge is, therefore, the unattainable unity of *pure* thinking, and the above described thinking of the Ego as absolute principle within perception = the moral law as highest representative of all contemplation. Now, this is on no account *this* or *that* knowledge, but simply absolute knowledge *as* such. How *this* or *that* knowledge is attained within it, we shall soon explain from one point. Now, this absolute knowledge is attained only on condition of the absolute *Being* entering even *knowledge itself*; and as sure as this knowledge is, the absolute Being is within *it*. And thus absolute Being and knowledge are united; the former enters the latter and is absorbed in the form of knowledge, by that very means making it absolute. Whoever has comprehended this, has mastered all truth, and to him there exists no longer an incomprehensible.

Thus in ascending from the one side; now let us determine the adjoining link of perception. The ground and central point of both links, of the material world and of the world of reason, is nothing else than the individual, determined through his reciprocity with the world of reason, as absolute principle of all perception. This individual *is*, for the eye of the merely sensual perception, firm and standing; but it is also a development of the absolute creative power of perception in a higher (reason-) time, starting *from an absolute point of beginning*.

(Only this point, as an apparently new addition, seems to require a proof, and this proof is easy. The knowledge of that power generally is dependent upon an absolute free thinking; hence appearing itself in consciousness as free. But this thinking again is dependent upon a contemplation, also appearing within consciousness (empirical knowledge generally) within an already ignited knowledge. Its beginning, therefore, as an absolute point falls within an already progressing succession of the knowledge of time generally. And it is necessary that this higher determinedness should be perceived, if any particular moment within it is to be perceived, which latter moment becomes then for the perceiving individual the beginning-point of a higher life.)

The Ego, therefore, is for this thinking, not reposing and

stationary, but absolutely progressing according to an eternal plan, which, in our thinking of God, is altogether closed, and *recognized* as such, though never perfectly *perceived*. But the Ego is also, in the same determinedness, absolute principle of general perception. Hence, by its progression, perception in its principle progresses also. That higher divine power in reason and Freedom (in absolute knowledge) is the eternal creative power of the material world. More expressive: The individual starts always from the perception of mere Being; for thereupon depends his knowledge generally, and particularly the thinking of his moral determination; and thus it is altogether a production of the often described reciprocity, but nothing at all in itself. But as he elevates himself to the thinking of his determination and becomes a something higher than all the world, an Eternal Being,—what, then, does the world become to him? A somewhat, in and upon which he elevates and erects what lies not in nature, but in the idea, and in the eternal, unchangeable idea which the closed system of all reason realizes in the (now free and thinking) Egos, and which it must possess in each moment of an infinite perception.

Let us take care not to carry the coarse materialistic ideas of a mechanical acting like those of an objective thing in itself, which we have already annihilated in the sphere of the empirical, over into the pure world of reason! The individual develops in thinking his individual determination: but he appears to himself as principle of sensuous perception, in the existence of which he also always rests; hence the determination of his power appears to himself here, according to our former conclusions, as actual acting. His pure thinking, therefore, becomes in perception, truly enough, an actual acting; but here only for himself and his individual consciousness. To be sure, it thus becomes a material appearance and enters the sphere of the universal perception, also according to our former deductions. But the intellectual character of his acting can be recognized only by those who by their thinking have elevated themselves into that system of reason, who contemplate themselves and the world in God. To the others it remains a mere material moving and acting, just as they act also. (It is the same with that intellectual character as with

the theory of the eternal which we teach here. Those other persons also hear our words, formulas, chains of ideas, &c. But no one, whose inner life is not awakened, discovers their meaning.)

What, then, is now—and with this I give the promised last solution—the mere, pure perception in its reality, without any thinking of the intellectual determinedness? We have already said it above: simply the condition on the part of the absolute, that knowledge is to appear at all in its empty, naked form. In thinking, the principle becomes principle of an altogether new and progressive knowledge; in the perception it is merely the connecting knowledge; hence—if it were not in regard to a possible progress of enlightenment altogether a mere nullity—the darkest, most imperfect knowledge which can be, if a knowledge is at all to remain and not to vanish into nothingness. In this lowest and darkest point the knowledge of perception remains forever, and all its apparent work is nothing but an unwinding and eternal repetition of the same pure nothing according to the mere law of a formal knowledge. They who remain in such a standpoint and such a root have indeed no existence at all; hence, also, do nothing, and are, therefore, in sum and substance, only appearances. The only thing, let it be well remarked, that still supports these appearances, relates them to and keeps them within God, is the mere possibility which lies beyond their knowledge, that they still can elevate themselves to the intellectual standpoint. The only thing, therefore, which may be said to—I do not say the vicious, the evil, the bad, but—the very best of men, as long as they remain in their immediateness—for viewed from the standpoint of truth they are equally null—to those who remain wrapped in sensuality, and do not elevate themselves to the ideas, is this: “It must not be quite impossible for you as yet to elevate yourselves to ideas, since God still tolerates you in the system of appearances.” In short, this decree of God of the continuing possibility of a Being is the only and true ground of the continuation of the appearance of an intelligence; if that is recalled, they vanish. It is the true moral ground of the whole world of appearances.

If the question, therefore, is put: why does perception stand just in that point in which it stands; and in no other? This

is the answer: *materialiter* perception stands in no point whatever; it stands in its own point as required by its formal Being and remains standing in it forever. The *real* time has not yet at all commenced within it, and its own time never produces anything new and solid (as the circular course of nature sufficiently demonstrates empirically); it is therefore, in reality, also no time at all, but a mere formal appearance ($=0$) awaiting a future filling up. Experience is never this or that experience, in an accidental and single manner, but always that experience which it must be according to that immanent law and the connection resulting therefrom. If persons speak about the best world and the traces of the kindness of God in this world, the reply is: The world is the very worst which can be, so far as it is in itself perfectly nothing. But on that very account the whole and only possible goodness of God is distributed over it, since from it and all its conditions the intelligence can elevate itself to the resolve to make it better. Anything further even God cannot grant us; for, even if he would, he cannot make us understand it unless we draw it from him ourselves. But that we can do infinitely. Glorification of pure truth within us; and whoever wants anything else and better knows not the Good, and will be filled with Badness in all his desires.

- ‡ 7. The Science of Knowledge as the schematic representation of the whole Ego and the absolute realization of its whole Freedom, in its form of absolute reflectibility of all the relations of the Ego.

Knowledge has been regarded in its highest sphere as pure originating from nothing. But in that it was regarded as positive, as real originating, not as non-originating. That was the form. But in the substance of originating it is already expressed that it might also not be; and hence the being of knowledge, when related to absolute Being, becomes accidental, a being which might also not be, an act of absolute Freedom. This accidentality of knowledge is yet to be described.

It evidently is the last remaining problem which we have to realize in actual knowledge. The realization of the idea of Being and Not-Being at the same time, which was advanced in our first synthesis, is a *thinking* by means of a picturing of the form of Being itself. Like all thinking, this also is

not without contemplation ; here, not without the contemplation of knowledge, as having already realized itself. Now, this existence of knowledge, in its *reality*, is cancelled by the thinking ; but, in order that it may be but cancelled, it must first be posited in *thinking*. (This is the highest picturing which has so often been mentioned, and the form of all other. Yet the thing is easy enough : only it has gone out of use by the common mode of thinking. Whoever says : A is not ; to him A is on that very account in his thinking. Now, in the above, knowledge is not negated generally, that it cannot be ; but it is negated in regard to absolute Being ; i. e. it is *thought*, in its Being, as that which might also not be.) Now, this is Freedom, and here absolute Freedom, indifference in regard to the absolute, whole (not this or that) knowledge itself.

a. Freedom, $\kappa\alpha\tau' \epsilon\lambda\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$, is therefore only a thought, and only within him, of course, who is himself the result of Freedom.

b. It is, *negatively* considered, nothing but the thought of the *accidentality* of absolute knowledge. Remark well the seeming contradiction : Knowledge is the absolute accidental or the accidental absolute, because it reaches into the quantity and the absolute ground-form of the same, the infinite time-succession. *Positively* considered : that Freedom is the thought of the absoluteness of knowledge, of the *self*-creation of knowledge through the self-realizing of Freedom. The union of both views is the conception of Freedom in its ideal and real existence.

c. This thought of the Freedom of knowledge is not without its Being, just as there is no thinking without contemplation ; it is the same thorough connection as in all our former syntheses. Now, this is Freedom, $\kappa\alpha\tau' \epsilon\lambda\upsilon\chi\eta\nu$, and all other Freedom is merely a subordinate species ; hence there is no Freedom without Being (limitation, necessity), and *vice versa*. Time is under the rule of this necessity ; only thinking is free. The intelligence would be altogether free after time had run out ; but then it would be nothing—would be an unreal (beingless) abstraction. Hence it remains true that knowledge in its substance is Freedom, but always Freedom *limited* in a determined manner (in determined points of reflection).

2. The absolute formal character of knowledge is, that it is

real originating; hence whenever knowledge is realized, it always arrives at a knowledge of *Freedom*. The lowest point in the principle of perception is feeling—the mere analogy of thinking. (It would become a thought if that principle were to attain the described possibility of the higher Freedom.) Every individual at least feels himself free. (This feeling may be disputed by wrong thinking; it may even be denied, though no sensible man has yet done so; but still it remains ineradicable, and can be demonstrated also to every thinker who is not totally enwrapped in his particular system.)

But this feeling of freedom is not without a feeling of limitation.

Hence, all Freedom is an abstraction from some particular reality—a mere picturing of the same.

3. In every lower degree of Freedom there is consequently contained for the individual a higher real Freedom, which he does not recognize himself, but which another individual can require him to recognize, and which for him is a limitation, concretion of himself. For instance, that lower degree of Freedom we have learned to know as the conception of some arbitrary sensuous end or purpose. Generally expressed, it is that Freedom which permits you to reflect or not to reflect upon the material object to which that end or design applies. (Here necessity and Freedom unite in one point.) Here knowledge posits itself as free, indifferent only in regard to this particular object; but it is confined in perception generally, though without remarking it. This is the condition of the sensual man. Everyone who stands higher can tell him that he has the power to elevate himself also above that state of bondage; but he does not know it himself.

But he also who knows of this other world may still abstract from that world; may not want to know at present, nor to consider, what this point in the succession of appearances signifies in its intelligible character. Such a person stands in the Freedom of reciprocal conditionedness; he is kept in bondage and imprisoned by his laziness. It is impossible, however, that a person who has reflected to the end should not act in accordance with those reflections; impossible that he should allow himself to be restrained from this acting by indolence.

But even in this state of mind and in this spirit a person may be theoretically enchained, though he be practically free; and this is the case when he does not explain his own state of mind to himself, when he allows it to remain an occult quality within him. (This is the condition of all mystics, saints, and religious persons, who are not enlightened in regard to their true principles; who do what is right, but do not understand themselves in doing so. Even to these, a theory like the present one can tell that they are not yet perfectly free, for even God, the Eternal, must not keep Freedom in subjection.)

In the total abstraction from all material objects of knowledge, from the entire contemplation with all its laws, hence, in the absolute realization of Freedom and in the indifference of knowledge with regard to contemplation, nevertheless also in the limitation to the one, immanent, formal law of knowledge, and its succession and consequence, does logic consist and everything that calls itself philosophy, but is in reality only logic; that which cannot go beyond the result of that standpoint: namely, finite human understanding. Its character is, like that of logic, its highest product, always to remain within the conditioned, and never to elevate itself to an unconditioned, to an Absolute of Knowledge and of Being.

In the abstraction from even this law, and from quantity in its primary form, hence also from *all* particular knowledge, does the Science of Knowledge consist. (It might be said, from another point of view, that this science consists and arises from a transcendentalizing of logic itself; for, if a logician were to ask himself, as I have frequently exemplified in the foregoing: how do I arrive at my assertions? he would necessarily get into the Science of Knowledge, and, in this manner the science has really been found by Kant, the true discoverer of its principle.) The standpoint of the Science of Knowledge is in the elevation above all knowledge, in the pure thinking of absolute Being, and in the accidentality of knowledge; it, therefore, consists in the thinking of this thinking itself; it is a mere pure thinking of the pure thinking, or of reason, the immanence, the *For-itself* of this pure thinking. Hence its standpoint is the same as that which I described above as the standpoint of absolute Freedom.

But this thinking (according to all our former reflections)

is not possible, unless knowledge is nevertheless within the contemplation wherein it is only figuratively annihilated. And thus the last question which I have promised to answer is solved, and with that our investigation concluded: the question, how the Science of Knowledge, being forced to go beyond all knowledge, could do so; whether, it being itself a knowledge, it did not always remain within knowledge and tied down to knowledge; how, therefore, it could go beyond itself *as* knowledge? It carries knowledge forever along in contemplation. Only in thinking it annihilates knowledge in order to reproduce it *in the same*.

And thus the Science of Knowledge is distinguished from life. It generates the *real* life of contemplation figuratively (schematically) in thinking. It retains the character of thinking, the schematic paleness and emptiness; and life retains its own, the concrete fullness of contemplation. Nevertheless both are altogether one, since only the unity of thinking and contemplation is the true knowledge—which in reality is indeed unapproachable and separates into those two links, each of which excludes the other;—it is the highest central-point of the intelligence.

The Science of Knowledge is absolutely factical from the standpoint of contemplation: the highest *fact*, that of knowledge (because *it might also not be*), is its basis; and the Science of Knowledge is deduction from the standpoint of thinking, which explains the highest fact from absolute Being and Freedom; but it is both in necessary-union, connecting with the actuality, and going beyond it in Thinking to its absolute ground. But what it thinks *is* in contemplation, though only immediate; in Thinking this is linked together as necessary. And it thinks that which *is*, for Being is necessary; and that which it thinks is, *because* it thinks it; for its thinking itself becomes the Being of knowledge. (The Science of Knowledge is no going beyond and explaining of knowledge from outside, hypothetical premises—for whence should these premises be taken for the universal?)

The Science of Knowledge is theoretical and practical at the same time. *Theoretical*: in itself an empty, merely schematic knowledge, without all body, substance, charm, &c. (And let it be well understood, all this it should despise.)

Practical: knowledge is to become free in actuality; this is part of its intellectual determination. Hence the Science of Knowledge is a duty to all those intelligences who in the succession of conditions have arrived at its possibility. But to this succession of conditions we arrive only through inner honesty, truthfulness, and uprightness.

Hence the honest endeavor to distribute this science is itself the carrying out of an eternal and imperishable design; for reason and its once acquired clear insight into itself is eternal. But it must be distributed in that spirit which an eternal purpose demands, with absolute denial of all finite and perishable ends. Not with the view that to-day or to-morrow this one or that one may comprehend it, for in that case only an egotistical object would be derived; but let it be unreflectingly thrown into the stream of time, merely in order that it be there. Let him who can, grasp and understand it; let whoever does not comprehend it, mistake and abuse it; all this, as nothing, must be indifferent to him who has grasped and been grasped by it.

ANALYSIS OF HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*.

Translated from the French of M. Ch. Bérard, by J. A. MARTLING.

DRAMATIC POETRY.—The necessity of seeing the actions and relations of human life represented by the persons who express them, is the origin of dramatic poetry. In place of limiting itself, like the epic, to the recital of a past action, it places before our eyes the personages who accomplish it, with all the accessories of scenic representation.

Three principal points are to be considered in the study of this variety of poetry: 1°. *the nature of a dramatic work* in itself, and the *characteristics*, whether *general* or *particular*, which distinguish it; 2°. *theatrical art*, or scenic representation; 3°. the *different classes* of dramatic poetry, and its *historic development*.

1°. Considered in a general manner, the drama unites the principle of epic with that of lyric poetry.